Camera Lucida is, obviously, a
distinctly personal approach to criticism; it is frustrating to read if you are
looking for a semiotics of photography. Barthes relies heavily on his own
subjective experience of photography, and even on photos that he refuses to
reprint because they will have no meaning for the reader.
This
emphasis on subjectivity is especially salient in light of Barthes’ opposing
concepts of the studium and the punctum. Of course, both are complex
ideas, and Barthes’ description of them has so much nuance that it’s difficult
to summarize. However, even in its most watered-down sense, I found his
definition of the punctum somewhat troubling, if attractive. The notion is so
specific to each individual photograph, and relies so heavily on individual
perception and experience, that it seems useless. It is impossible to define it in any general sense, and
indeed a strict definition would seem to defeat the purpose of the punctum—Barthes
writes “what I can name cannot really prick me” (51). But, then, how can this concept be taken
up by those following Barthes? As Dyer notes in the introduction, since the
idea of the punctum was so “seductive,” it became “almost a necessity … As the
search of a picture’s punctum took on
the quality of a critical dragnet—we know it’s in there somewhere!—so this
surprising detail lost its capacity to surprise, offered the same kind of
unconcealed or overt satisfaction as the studium
to which it had originally be opposed.” Apparently, the punctum is not really meant to—or able to—become a part of critical
discourse. But, in that case, I am not sure what to do with it otherwise--perhaps it is helpful to think of it as an emotional idea rather than a theoretical one.
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